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conflict in management studies. These models include diversity-conflict and behavioral negotiation models 8 
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1. Introduction 24 
The study of conflict in management began at the field’s inception with Dubin (1957) observing power conflicts 25 
between labor unions and managers within organizations. Thompson (1960) brought the study of conflict to the 26 
forefront when he observed that conflict is something ever-present in organizations and is to be avoided and controlled. 27 
Cyert and March’s (1963) seminal book, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, built on Thompson’s ideas, observing that conflict 28 
stems from incompatible goals and information among people who constitute an organization. Litterer (1966) agreed 29 
with Thompson, Cyert, and March on the ubiquity and often burdensomeness of conflict in organizational life, but also 30 
noted that, because it “energizes people to activity” (p. 180), conflict can be a positive thing for organizations – especially 31 
when innovation and change are wanted. Consequently, Litterer urged organizations, and those who study them, to find 32 
ways to harness the good and avoid the bad of conflict. Pondy (1967) complemented Litterer’s work by observing that 33 
conflict may be studied between or within organizations, suggesting that models of conflict may have different 34 
assumptions and uses depending on the level of analysis. Since these early works, many fruitful research areas on conflict 35 
arose; focusing on the positives and negatives conflict brings to organizations. Figure 1 provides an estimate of the rise 36 
and steady state of conflict research in top-tier management journals.1  37 
The management field studies conflict at different levels of analysis. Conflict can be studied within a person such 38 
as when modeling role conflict (e.g. Rizzo et al., 1970) and cognitive dissonance (e.g. Festinger, 1962). Conflict can also 39 
be studied among groups such as in the modeling of team competition (e.g. Johnson et al., 2006), network competition 40 
(e.g. Das & Teng, 2002), and firm sustainability in resource-constrained environments (e.g. Hart & Ahuja, 1996). Lastly, 41 
conflict can be studied within a group or a collective of agents who are interdependently connected (Sullivan, 2002) 42 
such as in modeling team diversity and alliance cooperation (e.g. Jehn, 1995; Zeng & Chen, 2003). 43 
The current review focuses on five models about conflict within a group or intragroup conflict. The models are 44 
diversity-conflict, behavioral negotiation, social dilemma, social exchange, and transaction cost economics models. 45 
There are several reasons for focusing on intragroup conflict models.2 First, while previous reviews focus primarily on 46 
the negatives (e.g. Rubin et al., 1994) or positives of conflict (e.g. De Dreu & Van De Vliert, 1997), there is has been 47 
little attempt to discuss complementarity among intragroup conflict models. The absence of such integration may be 48 
because the models are used in distinct areas of management with little crosstalk. Second, the research that reviews 49 
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specific models of intragroup conflict is primarily descriptive in findings and not theoretical insights.3 It is therefore our 50 
intention to highlight the foundational papers of the models reviewed and explain why the papers are critical and go 51 
one step further by reviewing some of the most recent contributions to these models.  52 
Taken together, the intragroup conflict models reviewed herein present several insights. The first is how conflict is 53 
conceptualized. Conflict is a “dynamic process” whereby at least one agent feels, perceives, or behaves in opposition 54 
toward another agent (Pondy, 1967). The ideas of conflict being a perception or feeling – coupled with the possibility 55 
of it producing positive outcomes for organizations – distinguish management’s study of the topic from other fields’. 56 
Whereas other fields – e.g. economics – consider an agent expending resources to harm another as a necessary condition 57 
of conflict (Garfinkel & Skaperdas, 2007), conflict as studied in management may be entirely a perception made by the 58 
individual agent in addition to it “manifesting” through behavior (Pondy, 1967).  59 
The second insight is that intragroup conflict does not always result in a negative outcome, providing some 60 
additional parsimony between management’s study of the topic and other’s in the social sciences. Some disciplines – 61 
e.g. international relations in political science – primarily view conflict as leading to negative outcomes (e.g. Levy & 62 
Thompson, 2011). Indeed, intragroup conflict does have its negative effects between individuals – be they people or 63 
organizations. As we shall discuss here, intragroup conflict is viewed primarily by social dilemma and transaction cost 64 
economics models as resulting in negative outcomes. However, the field of management approaches conflict as a 65 
contingency process that can benefit or harm an organization based on characteristics of that organization and its 66 
members (Litterer, 1966).4  The contingency of conflict is in the type of conflict occurring among the parties and the 67 
outcomes of these types of conflict can be positive, negative, or both. As shall be detailed in our discussion about 68 
diversity-conflict, negotiation, and social exchange models, intragroup conflict can lead to positive or negative outcomes 69 
for organizations. 70 
Before we begin, however, we observe that conflict research in management is vast – with enough research to fill 71 
multiple review volumes. The voluminous body of management scholarship on conflict developed from a field that is 72 
a melting pot of scholars who develop and borrow theory from many disciplines in the social and natural sciences 73 
(Ferraro et al., 2005); e.g. organizational theory, organizational behavior, strategy, sociology, psychology, economics, 74 
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social psychology, industrial psychology, history, industrial relations, political science, anthropology, and evolutionary 75 
biology. In management, any attempt to review every model of conflict in a single article would be futile.  76 
To give the curious student a survey of the forest and not the trees, we review the five intragroup conflict models 77 
most commonly studied in management. These five intragroup models were selected because they either “shifted” or 78 
“created consensus” about findings in conflict research (Hollenbeck, 2008). Section 2 reviews the models, and Section 79 
3 reviews the recent literature using those models. Section 4 provides future research directions, and Section 5 concludes 80 
the review. Table 1 summarizes the main models of intragroup conflict and foundational papers. 81 
2. Models of Intragroup Conflict 82 
In the current section, we summarize the foundational papers for each model. The first two models reviewed are 83 
often used to understand conflict within a group composed of people: diversity-conflict and behavioral-negotiation 84 
models. The third is the social dilemma model and is used to study conflict either within a group of people or 85 
organizations. The last two models – social exchange and transaction cost models – are often used to understand conflict 86 
within a group of organizations.  87 
2.1. Diversity-conflict Model 88 
Diversity is defined as differences people perceive that separate themselves from others (Perry-Smith & Shalley, 89 
2003). Such differences can be visible or invisible; e.g. race, gender, values, and work experience. Following Litterer 90 
(1966), the diversity-conflict model assumes that conflict can be positive or negative for an organization contingent on 91 
the characteristics of the task and individual members involved. Further, the diversity-conflict model assumes conflict 92 
has several dimensions, and each dimension is a mechanism explaining the impact of work-team diversity on team 93 
performance. The model created consensus from a mass of publications showing inconsistent relationships between 94 
conflict and work-team performance, and it is based on three papers led by Karen Jehn. The Jehn papers show nuances 95 
about the nature of conflict and its role in understanding diversity and team performance.  96 
Jehn (1995). The first paper is Jehn’s (1995) field survey of workers in the logistics industry and examines two 97 
dimensions of conflict in work teams: relational conflict and task conflict. Relational conflict is about interpersonal 98 
incompatibility and includes annoyance, agitation, and hostility among teammates. Task conflict is about team member 99 
incompatibility over ideas, the interpreting of information, and approaches to an organizational problem that the team 100 
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is facing (Jehn, 1995). Jehn (1995) found that team performance has an inverted-U relationship with task conflict: at low 101 
and high levels of task conflict, team performance is low, while a moderate level of task conflict improves team 102 
performance. Relationship conflict is robustly detrimental to team performance. Further, the nature of the task 103 
moderated the intensity of the effects between the two conflict dimensions and team performance. In routine tasks, 104 
teams that experienced either form of conflict did not perform well, but in non-routine tasks, moderated levels of task 105 
conflict were a blessing, not a curse.  106 
Jehn (1997). The second paper is Jehn’s (1997) case study of teams in a household-goods-moving organization. 107 
Jehn (1997) examined the relationship between relationship and task conflict dimensions with team performance and, 108 
more importantly, introduced the idea of process conflict. Process conflict is about incompatible preferences over how 109 
a task should be performed; e.g. how resources are allocated, who does what, and when (Jehn, 1997). Jehn (1997) 110 
introduced a new model of conflict with the different dimensions of conflict as antecedents, team performance as the 111 
outcome, and a host of team characteristics as moderators. Like relational conflict, process conflict had strong negative 112 
impact on team performance and teammate satisfaction. Process conflict ate up time the team could have used for the 113 
task and created uncertainty among teammates, motivating them to leave the team. Process conflict’s effect on team 114 
performance followed an inverted-J shape: low levels of process conflict provided direction and solidarity to the team 115 
and consequently improved their performance, while medium and high levels of process conflict increasingly decreased 116 
team performance and teammate satisfaction.  117 
Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale (1999). The final foundational paper of the diversity-conflict model is Jehn et al.’s 118 
(1999) field study of work teams in the household-goods-moving industry. Jehn et al. (1999) linked team diversity 119 
characteristics with team performance, using conflict dimensions as mediators. Team diversity characteristics included 120 
social category characteristics (e.g. gender and race), informational characteristics (e.g. education and background), and 121 
value characteristics; e.g. quantity versus quality and ends versus means. Jehn et al. (1999) found that information 122 
diversity increased task conflict among teammates that positively affected team performance. Second, value diversity 123 
increased relational conflict within the team that negatively affected team performance. Lastly, value diversity increased 124 
process conflict among teammates that negatively affected teammate sentiments of team morale, intent to remain, and 125 
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commitment. One process strategy that can be employed to resolve conflict among organizational members is 126 
negotiation; however, as we shall see, what people should do in a negotiation is not the same as what they actually do. 127 
2.2. Behavioral Negotiation Model 128 
Negotiation is a strategic process for navigating conflict and is broadly defined as the process whereby two or more 129 
parties decide what each will give and take in a relationship (Thompson, 2015). Within management, the dominant 130 
model used to study negotiation is the behavioral negotiation model. An interpersonal model, the behavioral negotiation 131 
model assumes the group of negotiators are bounded rationally in their cognitive abilities (Simon, 1982), leaving the 132 
negotiators susceptible to cognitive biases triggered by their interaction with the opponents and the deal’s context. The 133 
cognitive biases undermine the information sharing process between the parties, thereby impacting the value created 134 
and claimed from the negotiation (Thompson, 1991). Like the diversity-conflict model, conflict is not seen as always 135 
being a burden, but rather than opportunity for parties to create value that could not be achieved acting alone. The 136 
pivotal works either introduced or integrated key ideas in negotiation from across several disciplines.  137 
Walton and McKersie (1965). Until Walton and McKersie’s (1965) book, negotiation scholarship was primarily 138 
descriptive and studied disparately in economics, political science, and labor relations. Little theory explained the various 139 
findings in labor disputes, arbitration, contract law, and traditional buyer-seller bargaining. Walton and McKersie (1965) 140 
introduced a central framework for thinking about negotiation by describing two different strategic approaches: 141 
distributive versus integrative negotiation. Distributive approaches focus on claiming as much value as possible for 142 
oneself and consist primarily of the use of threats and emotional appeals to influence counterparties to make 143 
concessions. Integrative approaches focus on creating and claiming value and consist of sharing information about 144 
interests and priorities and then finding tradeoffs to generate joint gains (Pruitt, 1981). Walton and McKersie’s (1965) 145 
were consensus shifter, providing conflict scholars a package of context-specific models about how negotiators discover 146 
and divide resources.  147 
Pruitt and Rubin (1986). The second work is Pruitt and Rubin’s (1986) book Social conflict. Therein, Pruitt and 148 
Rubin (1986) introduced the dual-concerns model. The dual-concern model maintains that a negotiator has concerns 149 
for their own outcome and the other party’s. Contingent on the weight the negotiator places on each of these concerns 150 
constitutes the strategy she will use during the negotiation process. Negotiators with a high concern for the other’s 151 
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outcome and a low concern for themselves yield to requests from the opponent; when concern for the other and oneself 152 
is high then a problem-solving approach is taken to reach a deal; should concern for the other and oneself be low then 153 
it is predicted the negotiator will be disengaged from the negotiation; and lastly, when the concern for other is low and 154 
high for the self then the negotiator will contend aggressively to further her interests. The power of the dual-concerns 155 
model is not found in predicting negotiation outcomes, but rather in predicting the strategies negotiators use to achieve 156 
those outcomes. Further, the value of dual-concerns model was the idea of perceptions other than the focal negotiator 157 
when developing the now-popular behavioral negotiation model. 158 
Neale and Northcraft (1991). The last contribution is Neale and Northcraft’s (1991) dual-party behavioral 159 
negotiation model. In presenting the model, Neale and Northcraft (1991) synthesize a sizable body of disparate empirical 160 
research into a model that predicts negotiation outcomes as a function of contextual and negotiator characteristics. 161 
Their main proposition is that any negotiation outcome is a function of the context the negotiators find themselves in 162 
and the characteristics of the negotiators themselves. Contextual characteristics are fixed elements of the negotiation 163 
environment; e.g. payoff functions between the parties, time pressure, whether negotiation occurs through a third party, 164 
or whether it occurs through a rich, compared to lean, media such as face-to-face versus text messaging. Negotiator 165 
characteristics are visible behaviors such as mood and emotions, personality and physical appearance, communication 166 
methods, and non-visible cognitions such as information processing and biases. Further, compared to contextual 167 
characteristics, negotiator characteristics can be dynamic - as emotions, ways of communication, and information 168 
processing can change over time. The elegance of Neale and Northcraft’s (1991) model is that research can be 169 
categorized into one of these bins of characteristics.  170 
2.3. Social Dilemma Models 171 
Individual members of a group are often tempted to act in their own self-interest and profit from selfish choices, 172 
even though the whole group is better off cooperating. Such situations, in which individual benefits conflict with 173 
collective benefits, are called social dilemmas. The conflict between individual and collective rationality represents a 174 
fundamental challenge that organizations continually face, involving multiple levels of social interaction. The key issue 175 
surrounding social dilemmas is whether individuals can cooperate and prioritize the interest of the collective over the 176 
personal benefit, and if so, how such cooperation and coordination can be achieved (e.g. Sally, 1995). Cooperation in 177 
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social dilemmas is inherently difficult and risky. A traditional economic framework predicts that because rational 178 
individuals always attempt to maximize one’s utility and make decisions that provide the greatest benefit in their highest 179 
self-interest, cooperative solutions are unlikely or unstable (Luce & Raiffa, 2012). Like the models previously reviewed, 180 
social dilemma models view conflict as being either a negative or positive thing. Each article below was instrumental in 181 
developing the models of social dilemmas because they either were the first to introduce the model, create consensus 182 
out of disparate findings about how social dilemmas are solved, or shift consensus about how we think about conflict 183 
in social dilemmas.  184 
Dawes (1980). Dawes (1980) introduced the idea of social dilemmas and identified two outcome-relevant 185 
properties of them: (a) everyone receives the highest payoff for a selfish choice regardless of others’ choices, and (b) 186 
everyone ends up receiving a lower payoff if all choose to defect rather than to cooperate. Therefore, a social dilemma 187 
is marked by a deficient equilibrium in which everyone has dominating strategies. Dawes coined the concept of the n-188 
person prisoner’s dilemma by introducing “give some” and “take some” games.5 To the extent that social dilemmas 189 
involve interpersonal comparisons of payoffs, one way of eliciting cooperation is changing payoffs by introducing 190 
rewards and punishments. Dawes (1980) argues that this simple approach however raises an important question of who 191 
changes it and how to change it. The extent to which individuals value mutual benefits may be determined by other 192 
influences, such as altruism, norms and conscience that are beyond a payoff structure and material outcomes.  193 
Messick and Brewer (1983). In addition to n-person dilemmas, Messick and Brewer (1983) further discussed 194 
interdependent interactions in a broader context in which self-interested behavior damages collective well-being. Social 195 
traps indicate situations in which individuals pursue immediate gains that are seemingly beneficial, which in the long run 196 
lead to a larger loss for the whole group. For example, if all members continue to exploit a common resource for their 197 
individual benefit, the resources will eventually be depleted. On the other hand, social fences refer to situations in which 198 
members of a group are tempted to avoid an immediate cost for collective benefits such that individuals’ inaction and 199 
under-contribution hurt the group. They also discussed the temporal dimension of social dilemmas in which the 200 
outcome of the action is delayed. In this review, two types of solutions to social dilemmas were suggested. The first 201 
approach aims at influencing psychological and behavioral variables associated with actors’ cooperative behavior. For 202 
example, communication is one of the prominent solutions under this category. Encouraging communication among 203 
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actors in social dilemmas allows them to exchange information about choices of others and creates a sense of group 204 
identity and feelings of identification. The second type of the solutions focuses on interventions that change the 205 
structural features of social dilemmas, such as the payoff structure and the group’s decision structure. 206 
Kollock (1998). Kollock (1998) further divided solutions to social dilemmas into three broad types depending on 207 
whether the solution assumes self-interested actors - motivational, strategic, and structural solutions. Motivational 208 
solutions assume that individuals can take their partners’ outcomes into account. Strategic solutions assume egoistic 209 
decision-makers and do not involve structural changes in social dilemmas. Because strategic solutions are contingent 210 
upon the decision of actors that influence the outcome and behavior of their partners, such a solution is restricted to 211 
repeated two-person dilemmas. For example, reciprocal or tit-for-tat strategies have been shown to maintain 212 
cooperation in a two-person social dilemma. Finally, structural solutions involve changes in the rules of social dilemmas. 213 
Specifically, Kollock (1998) highlighted the importance of creating or reinforcing structural features that can facilitate 214 
strategic solutions. The use of monitoring and sanctioning systems can be implemented by using selective incentives 215 
and punishments. 216 
Weber, Kopelman, and Messick (2004). The last paper challenged how we think about conflict in social 217 
dilemmas. The Weber et al. (2004) paper draws from James March’s (1994) idea of the logic of appropriateness to 218 
provide alternative explanations for why people cooperate in social dilemmas. The appropriateness framework is more 219 
about perceptions than calculations. The framework maintains that – in addition to weighing the costs and benefits of 220 
a decision – individuals make decisions based on normative rules. Normative rules – e.g. “women and children first!” – 221 
are followed as a function of a person’s perception of what the decision’s context is and what their role in that situation 222 
is. In short, Weber et al. (2004) introduce the idea that individuals may not just ask “What are the positives and negatives 223 
of me cooperating in this social decision problem?” but also ask “What does a person like me (role) do (rules) in a 224 
situation like this (context)?” A core insight of the Weber et al. (2004) paper is that it suggests that the conflict between 225 
individual and collective preferences in social dilemmas does not always lead to a negative outcome that needs structural 226 
and psychological solutions (as maintained in the previous three reviewed papers); but rather can encourage people to 227 
cooperate and achieve collective action as a function of how the social dilemma is framed.  228 
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2.4. Social Exchange Model 229 
The social exchange model approaches conflict among organizational groups out of effectiveness rather than 230 
efficiency considerations. Specifically, the model crosses levels of analysis from between individuals and organizational 231 
groups by assuming institutions and structures are negotiated through social interaction (Blau, 1964). Boundary spanning 232 
role representatives behave and act, on behalf of their organizations, as decision makers based upon the norms, values 233 
and constraints of their organization. In turn, the boundary spanners’ actions subsequently influence the collective 234 
beliefs their organization holds towards the exchange partner (e.g. Zaheer et al., 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Due 235 
to its broad perspective on effectiveness, which may be gained by power, to enhancing conflict outcomes, social 236 
exchange theory has become one the most prevalent paradigms in explaining conflict.  237 
Through the lens of social exchange theory, conflict involves the friction between the interests of the powerful 238 
maintaining their power over the interests of the less powerful seeking independence (Blau, 1964). As such, each person 239 
has an expected cost-benefit ratio of each relationship, based on prior experiences (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). If an 240 
individual receives fewer benefits from a given relationship than expected or less than what they could obtain from 241 
another, they will most likely terminate the relationship. A central tenet of this theory is the concept of reciprocity norm 242 
(Gouldner, 1960), which is the expectation that individuals will treat others as they are treated. As such individuals 243 
expect the benefits they have given to others will be paid back. There are caveats in which one party has more power 244 
than the other and may force the opposing party to provide benefits with little reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). The weaker 245 
party may be so dependent on scant benefits received from the more powerful party they must tolerate significant 246 
inequity in benefits. Such imbalances in reciprocity identified by Blau (1964) have become known as power asymmetry. 247 
The breadth of benefits from relationship exchanges may yield effective organizational arrangements through enhancing 248 
outcomes such as power which yield control of other actors or resources, as well as reducing constraints in the external 249 
environment (Grandori, 1991; Scott & Davis, 2003).  250 
Unlike the models mentioned above, conflict from the social exchange perspective is viewed negatively for the 251 
relationship as a whole, as well as the more dependent party. In contrast, conflict is largely viewed positively when the 252 
result of the conflict yields increased power, whilst negatively for the party that becomes more dependent. Instabilities 253 
in power are typically viewed as motives for terminating relationships, which might be viewed negatively if there is an 254 
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expectation of continuity (e.g. Polidoro et al., 2011). Broadly, this raises issues over sources of power which involve 255 
access to resources, availability of alternatives, political coercion or legitimacy, and conflicting ideologies over resources 256 
controlled by the powerful (Blau, 1964).  257 
Emerson (1962). Emerson’s (1962) classic conceptualization of power defines it in relational terms, as a function 258 
of an actor’s dependence on the other. The power of actor, Party A, over the other actor, Party B, formally, is defined 259 
as the inverse of Party B’s dependence on Party A. Dependence may arise from the need for resources, organizational 260 
size, and bargaining alternatives. Emerson (1962) clarified that power is not isolated to an individual or group but as a 261 
relationship of one actor over another. Given the relative nature of power, it is important to consider who controls the 262 
resource in question over those who are dependent on the resource (Gomes-Casseres, 1994). Further, Cook and 263 
Emerson (1978) clarify that power may not only occur in a dyadic relation but also can occur amongst multiple actors 264 
in a network.  265 
Blau (1964). Social exchange theory was initially conceptualized through the lens of behaviorism (Homans, 1958). 266 
However, it was Blau (1964) who took - what is now the most utilized approach - an economic and utilitarian perspective 267 
to explain social exchange. Although, he conceived of behavior in terms of costs and rewards, Blau maintained that 268 
behavior was determined by the rewards or costs the individual anticipates they will receive in the future rather than the 269 
rewards they received in the past, which is the opposite of behaviorism. Blau (1964) also contributed to the theory by 270 
establishing a link between micro-level behaviors and macro-level phenomena.6 Blau and Scott (1962) saw the firm 271 
interacting in a context of an external environment consisting of an “organizational set”. Lastly, Blau (1964) defined 272 
power as “the ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through deterrence” (p. 117). 273 
Blau (1964) also notes that relationships may exhibit equilibrium in one instance and yet face disequilibrium in others. 274 
For example, a supplier firm might control access to a key input needed to the buying firm, exerting power over the 275 
buying firm. However, the buying firm might be able to anticipate changes in the downstream market more quickly than 276 
the supplier firm, negating the supplier firm’s influence and control in the long-term. Thus, both the stability and 277 
instability of power become key areas of interest to social exchange theories.  278 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Social exchange theory evolved the study organizational conflict through resource 279 
dependency theory developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Drawing on social exchange theory assumptions, resource 280 
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dependence seeks to understand why a firm may act beyond economic efficiency considerations. Firms manage the 281 
costs and benefits of their relationships in a give-and-take (Scott & Davis, 2003). Resource dependence identifies three 282 
important considerations. First, building on Blau and Scott’s (1962) idea of the “organizational set,” Pfeffer and Salancik 283 
(1978) observe there is a social context in which organizations are responding to actions taken by other organizations. 284 
Organizations are not independently making decisions in isolation from each other. Second, organizations may draw on 285 
a much wider set of strategies to alleviate constraints in their environment beyond a binary market versus acquisition 286 
governance choices. Firms invoke several social strategies such as using their board of directors, industry associations 287 
and strategic alliances to manage their need for autonomy. Third, drawing on Emerson (1962) an organization becomes 288 
effective and unconstrained by seeking power, rather than efficiency, to manage their external relationships. Scott and 289 
Davis (2003, p. 234) summarize the goal of the resource dependency approach as “organizations should choose the 290 
least constraining approach to coordinate relations with other organizations and to reduce the dependence that their 291 
exchanges create.” 292 
2.5. Transaction Cost Economics 293 
Transaction cost economics has been broadly applied to study alliance relationships. Lumineau and colleagues 294 
(2015) noted that the central concept of opportunism in transaction cost theory comports well as a model understanding 295 
conflict among organizational groups due to its “emphasis on self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985, p. 6, 296 
47). Specifically, without such noisy bargaining tactics, parties would coordinate on the open market efficiently, leaving 297 
costlier forms of governance such as joint ventures and acquisitions as less desirable forms of organizing. Early 298 
theorizing by Commons (1932, p. 4) also raised the link between conflict and transactions by suggesting that the unit of 299 
analysis, the transaction, exhibits three conditions ‘mutuality, conflict and order’. Williamson (2000, p. 599) notes the 300 
role of designing efficient forms of governance mechanisms are to “craft order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize 301 
mutual gains.” Conflict would be largely viewed negatively in transaction cost economics due to the increased costs of 302 
governance required to mitigate risks of opportunism. However, management scholars integrate transaction cost 303 
approaches with other theories which might yield positive outcomes for firms through contracting capabilities (Argyres, 304 
1996) as well as integrating trust into governance decisions (Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  305 
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Coase (1937). Coase’s (1937) theorizing sought to answer the question of the nature of the firm. In a comparative 306 
assessment between the firm and the market he asked, ‘why would firms exist?’ He defined a firm as “the system of 307 
specialized relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur” 308 
(p. 393). Such a definition brought forth a relative comparison between the actions of the entrepreneur organizing within 309 
the boundaries of the firm versus the price available in the market. Specifically, Coase highlighted that under certain 310 
conditions transactions may be more efficiently carried out by the firm than the market. He identified that bargaining 311 
in the market might be costly due to uncertainty with writing contracts which may involve third-parties such as lawyers 312 
as well as time taken to negotiate (Scott & Davis, 2003).  313 
Williamson (1975). Williamson’s (1975) work on transaction cost economics is widely credited with giving the 314 
theory empirical traction. Building on Coase’s (1937) comparison between market and hierarchy efficiencies, Williamson 315 
(1981, p. 552) defines a transaction as an instance “when a good or service is transferred across a technologically 316 
separable interface.” This allowed for a study of contracts, or verbal agreements, between actors, such as two 317 
organizations’ respective boundary spanners, for the exchange of goods or services (Scott & Davis, 2003). The costs of 318 
arranging contracts, such as planning and revising the agreement as well as overseeing the task through completion are 319 
known as transaction costs. Williamson (1975) further identified three conditions under which small numbers bargaining 320 
might arise increasing the costs for a transaction to take place in the market. First, Williamson, building on Coase’s 321 
notion of uncertainty as well as incorporating ideas of bounded rationality (Simon, 1982), identified opportunism as a 322 
source of conflict in exchange (Williamson, 1975, 1985). This concern over behavioral uncertainty limits the extent to 323 
which exchange partners can identify all possible contingencies from the exchange. Second, Williamson identified the 324 
frequency of exchange, as the more often a transaction occurs with a partner the greater complexity and fewer 325 
alternatives might be available (Williamson, 1979). Third, is the role of asset specificity, which limits the ability of the 326 
partners to redeploy investments for alternate uses, thereby decreasing available bargaining partners. Because of the 327 
inherent risks of vulnerability towards their exchange partner, the focal party making asset specific investments, will 328 
seek safeguards to protect their self-interest in the exchange. These safeguards lead to costlier forms of governance such 329 




3. Recent Trends about Conflict in Management 332 
Here we examine the contributions to the conflict literature published in the last decade, drawing on the five conflict 333 
models reviewed above. Because some topics straddle multiple domains in addition to management, several of our sub-334 
sections focus on specific papers while others use a host of papers that examine a specific trend.  335 
3.1. Trends using the diversity-conflict model 336 
Since Jehn’s seminal papers on conflict, management scholars have examined how the negative conflict dimensions 337 
- relational and process conflict - can be mitigated to improve team performance. The trend begins with Greer et al.’s 338 
(2011) field study of sales teams in the Dutch telecommunications industry. Greer et al. (2011) maintain that teams with 339 
high power or influence in an organization will encourage its teammates to seek more power and to maintain the power 340 
they have, competing with other power-hungry teammates. Consequently, teams in high power will experience more 341 
inter-personal conflict and sub-par performance compared to those teams in low power. They found evidence for 342 
relational and process conflict mediating the relationship between team power and performance. Further, the study 343 
went on to find that power congruence, teammate perceptions of each other’s power within the team, dampens the 344 
impact team power has on team conflict. They found that process conflict was present in high power teams only when 345 
power congruence was low. In other words, managers can capitalize on powerful individuals working together in 346 
organizations if they align perceptions of the pecking order among powerful teammates.  347 
A second contribution is Nishii’s (2013) field study of workers in a biomedical firm. Nishii (2013) examines ways 348 
to reduce relational and task conflict in gender diverse teams through a climate of inclusion. Climate of inclusion is an 349 
individual’s perception that the team possesses fair procedures and distribution rules for rewards; an environment that 350 
embraces differences and ways to resolve them; and a system that involves teammates in the team decision-making 351 
process. Nishii (2013) found that the negative effect of social categorical diversity on relational diversity and subsequent 352 
team performance was dampened when climate of inclusion was high compared to when it was low. A key insight here 353 
is that managers can reduce the devastating effects of relational conflict on teams - not by encouraging homophily at 354 
the team’s design - but by changing how current teammates perceive each other. 355 
Another avenue of interest is how the leader perceives the team and their diversity. Tepper et al.’s (2011) field study 356 
of supervisor-subordinate relations in hospitals examined the roles of perceived deep-level diversity in values and ways 357 
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of approaching problems between the supervisor and subordinate, relational conflict, and work performance on 358 
perceived abusive behavior from supervisors. They found that relational conflict mediated the positive relationship 359 
between the supervisor’s perceived deep-level diversity and the subordinate’s perception of being abused by the 360 
supervisor; however, this was only the case when the subordinate’s performance was low. In other words, the Tepper 361 
et al. (2011) paper suggests that supervisors justify their ill treatment of subordinates who are different from them 362 
primarily when they perceive the subordinates as poor performers. 363 
Further, Klein and colleagues’ (2011) field study of volunteer humanitarian service teams in the USA investigated 364 
how leader behaviors impacted the relationship between team value diversity and team effectiveness - with team conflict 365 
as the mechanism. The authors examined whether different leadership types - i.e. task-oriented and person-oriented 366 
leadership - would moderate the impact of diversity in work ethic and morals among teammates on team conflict, and 367 
subsequent team performance. Leadership moderates the relationship between team diversity and performance through 368 
team conflict, but it depends on the type of diversity and leadership approach. Leaders whose behaviors are heavily 369 
task-oriented could reduce team conflict where there was high work-ethic diversity. Further, leaders whose behaviors 370 
are heavily person-oriented could reduce team conflict in morally diverse teams. In either case, the leadership style’s 371 
reduction of team conflict enabled diverse teams to perform better compared to when leaders exhibit little attention to 372 
the task or the workers. 373 
Lount et al. (2015) investigated whether a leader’s perceptions of categorical diversity in teams impacts their 374 
willingness to provide requested resources to assist them in their tasks. The experiments report that leaders perceive 375 
more relationship conflict in a racially diverse team compared to a homogeneous one, and the increased perception of 376 
relationship conflict affects the leaders’ generosity in supplying resources. Lount et al. (2015) complements the other 377 
papers by shifting the focus of inter-personal prejudice from the team to those looking from outside. 378 
A new source of conflict in teams has generated a new conversation among management scholars: status conflict. 379 
Bendersky and Hays’ (2012) study of MBA students introduce status conflict and examine its effect on team 380 
performance. Status conflict occurs there are disagreements among teammates over their relative amount of respect 381 
received in the team’s social hierarchy. Bendersky and Hays (2012) provide several insights to the conversation about 382 
the diversity-conflict model. First, status conflict negatively affects team performance by discouraging information 383 
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sharing among teammates. Also, team cooperativeness or the norm among teammates to communicate and work 384 
together, attenuated the effect of status conflict on performance. 385 
Building on Bendersky and Hays (2012), Anicich et al. (2015) examined the interaction between status and power 386 
on interpersonal conflict in teams. They observe that the interpersonal conflict teams experience stems from the 387 
interaction of perceptions teammates have about each other. Through a series of laboratory experiments and a field 388 
survey of government workers, Anicich et al. finds that those with high power and low status in teams use their power 389 
to abuse their low-power teammates compared to those teams with high status. 390 
3.2. Trends using the behavioral negotiation model 391 
The behavioral negotiation model separates negotiation influences into negotiator characteristics and contextual 392 
characteristics. The three negotiator characteristics that receive the most attention are biases, emotions, and gender. 393 
Three contextual characteristics that receive considerable attention are power, number of negotiating parties, and time. 394 
3.2.1. Negotiator characteristics 395 
Biases. A substantial body of work in negotiations has looked at the role of cognition and biases in the negotiation 396 
process. Such biases included anchoring (Northcraft & Neale, 1987) and over-confidence (Neale & Bazerman, 1983). 397 
While early research was focused on cognition (e.g. Bazerman & Neale, 1992), later research focused on motivational 398 
biases. Egocentrism is a particularly pervasive bias in negotiation that leads negotiators to view themselves as entitled 399 
to more resources than their counterpart (Loewenstein et al., 1989). Egocentrism is especially pronounced when power 400 
is asymmetric (Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996) and this effect generalizes across cultures (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002a) and 401 
generations (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2008). Further, egocentrism can skew people’s expectations of others’ behaviors in 402 
negotiations (Tenbrunsel, 1998). Consistent with this finding, in a recent series of experiments, Chambers and De Dreu 403 
(2014) showed strong evidence for the occurrence of egocentric misperception of the other side’s priorities and interests. 404 
The studies showed that participants judged their own interests to be more important than their opponent’s, regardless 405 
of the opponent’s interest. They found that perceptions of the opponent’s interests were often more closely related to 406 
one’s own interests than to the opponent’s actual interests.  407 
Emotions. Seminal research by Carnevale and Isen (1986) introduced emotion into negotiation research by 408 
showing that negotiators experiencing positive affect were more cooperative and reached higher joint gains as opposed 409 
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to a control group. More recent scholarship has turned their attention to studying the benefits and burdens of negative 410 
emotions. The expression of negative emotions - e.g. anger - in negotiations is found to produce lower joint gains (Antos 411 
et al., 2011), covert retaliation (Wang et al., 2012), and reduced trust (Côté et al., 2013). Van Kleef et al. (2010) introduced 412 
a model called Emotion as Social Information that predicts when anger and other negative emotions will lead to 413 
concessions and when they will not. Specifically, when anger provides information about a negotiator’s own higher 414 
limits, anger motivates the counterparty to make concessions (Van Kleef, et al., 2010; Sinaceur et al., 2011). Subsequent 415 
research has shown how the model is contingent on other characteristics of the situation such as culture (Adam & 416 
Shirako, 2013; Adam et al., 2010), whether the anger is viewed as authentic (Tng & Au, 2014), and the competitiveness 417 
of the negotiation (Adam & Brett, 2015).  418 
Scholars have also investigated more nuanced and contingent effects of emotion on negotiations. Sinaceur et al. 419 
(2013) showed that when the negotiator expressed emotional inconsistency, the recipient made greater concessions than 420 
when the negotiator expressed a consistent emotion. This was mediated by the recipient feeling less in control. Zhang 421 
et al. (2014) found that certain emotions are seen more positively in conflict-resolution depending on cultural values. 422 
Netzer et al. (2015) showed that negotiators try to increase an emotion in others when they believe it will lead to desirable 423 
outcomes and try to decrease an emotion in others when they believe it will lead to undesirable outcomes. This occurred 424 
even when the emotion made the other person feel worse, indicating that although inducing emotions in others can lead 425 
to personal gain, it can also cause harm to others.  426 
Gender. Gender affects interpretations of the negotiation, negotiation style, negotiation performance, self-427 
evaluation and self-worth, and the propensity to initiate negotiation. Women tend to interpret conflict situations in 428 
relationship terms and men are more concerned with the exchange of resources (Pinkley, 1990). Men are more likely to 429 
adopt a confrontational style and women are more likely to display communal focus and approaches (Tannen, 1990; 430 
King & Hinson, 1994). Men are more likely to achieve higher gains on the distributive dimensions of negotiation 431 
outcomes (Stuhlmacher & Walter, 1999), but women are better able to increase join gain (Kray & Thompson, 2005). 432 
Women tend to engage in self-derogation during negotiation (Kimmel et al., 1980), expect to be paid less than men 433 
(Major & Konar, 1984), and are less assertive than men for fear of backlash (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013). Finally, 434 
women are less likely to engage in negotiation to begin with (Babcock et al., 2006).  435 
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Recent research has sought to create consensus among inconsistencies regarding the role of gender differences in 436 
negotiation styles. Faramand and Tu (2013) found that gender does not significantly affect business negotiation styles, 437 
while social culture does. Bowles & Flynn (2010) found that women negotiators were more persistent with male 438 
naysayers than female naysayers, but they persisted in a more indirect than direct manner. Leibbrandt and List (2015) 439 
found that in the workplace, men will negotiate for a higher wage more often than women if there is no explicit statement 440 
that wages are negotiable. If it is explicitly stated that wages are negotiable, then the gender difference disappears. This 441 
gives some insight into how negotiation relates to the gender wage gap in businesses. 442 
In a provocative set of studies, Lee and colleagues (2016) sought to better understand the underlying reasons for 443 
some of the gender differences in negotiation. Using an evolutionary psychology approach, the authors predicted that 444 
because of greater male intra-sexual competition for mates, unethical behavior would be greater in negotiations between 445 
men than between women. A positive relationship between unethical behavior and mating motivation was found for 446 
men, but not women. Gender differences in unethical behavior, were greater with males and showed more unethical 447 
behavior when negotiating between same-sex, attractive opponents.  448 
3.2.2. Contextual characteristics 449 
Power. In negotiation, power is primarily determined by one’s ability to induce the other party to settle for an 450 
outcome less than her maximum utility (Greenhalgh et al., 1985) and the strength of one’s best alternative to a negotiated 451 
agreement relative to one’s opponent (Pinkley et al., 1994). Best alternatives have been found to have several effects on 452 
negotiators. For example, negotiators with better alternatives set higher goals (Pinkley, 1995), behave more agentically 453 
(Galinsky et al., 2003), and are more likely to use threats (Lawler, 1992).  454 
Power associated with social status, the esteem and respect conferred by others, has its own set of effects on 455 
negotiation. For example, high status parties may treat others in more procedurally just ways, such as listening to their 456 
counterparts’ concerns and opinions, but only when the high-status parties also have a weaker alternative (Blader & 457 
Chen, 2012). Wolfe and McGinn (2005) demonstrated that objective power and perceived relative power have different 458 
effects on negotiation outcomes. They found that objective power drives individual payoffs, while perceived relative 459 
power exerts a strong effect on joint outcomes. Specifically, as perceived equality increases the potential for integration 460 
in the negotiation increases. 461 
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Insights into negotiation strategies are offered by Schweinsberg and colleagues (2012). Their research showed that 462 
extreme first offers may offend recipients and lead to an impasse but if the impasse is avoided it can bring benefits. 463 
Therefore, extreme offers can be risky. Furthermore, it was found that although both low- and high-power negotiators 464 
are offended by extreme offers, it is the low power negotiators who walk away. 465 
Teams and multi-party negotiations. Multi-party negotiation is characterized by a higher level of complexity and 466 
longer time to settle as compared to dyadic negotiations. Research has found that teams achieved higher outcomes and 467 
perceived themselves to be more powerful as compared to individual opponents (Polzer, 1996). Teams exchange more 468 
information and generate higher-quality ideas for solutions as compared to individual negotiators. Hinds and Mortensen 469 
(2005) examined conflict and its effects on distributed teams to determine how existing models of conflict for co-located 470 
teams apply to distributed teams. They found that distributed teams experienced more task conflict and interpersonal 471 
conflict than collocated teams. Also, spontaneous communication had a direct effect on mitigating the effect of 472 
distribution in conflict. This shows that spontaneous communication is a useful tool in handling conflict for distributed 473 
teams. Swaab et al. (2012) proposed that the impact of communication channels depends on whether the communicator 474 
is cooperative or not. A meta-analysis supported the validity of this model for understanding the effect of 475 
communication channels on negotiation and group decision-making. Communication channels (i.e. visual channels, 476 
vocal channels, synchronicity) increased high-quality negotiation only when the communicator orientation was neutral. 477 
When cooperation was dominant, communication channels neither hurt nor hindered negotiation quality. When 478 
noncooperation was dominant, communication channels hindered outcome quality. 479 
Time. Time plays a role in negotiation processes and outcomes in several ways. First, outcome delays – occurring 480 
when parties negotiate about future outcomes – moderate preferences and expectations. Research shows that outcome 481 
delays increase the efficiency reaching agreements due to perceptions of less contentious and aggressive opponents 482 
(Okhuysen et al., 2003). Time pressures have also been found to affect negotiators’ perceptions and abilities to reach 483 
efficient outcomes. Agreements tend to favor the negotiator with less time pressure (Moore, 2004a) but informing the 484 
other party about a deadline can lead them to make concessions faster (Moore, 2004b). In addition, De Dreu (2003) 485 
found that time pressure reduces negotiators’ motivation to process information systematically, produces a greater 486 
reliance on cognitive heuristics, and leads to less integrative agreements.  487 
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3.3. Trends using social dilemma models  488 
In the most recent review and analysis of social dilemmas in the organizational literature, Van Lange et al. (2013) 489 
conclude that the study of social dilemmas is “alive and kicking.” The review looks at different types of social dilemmas, 490 
recent developments in the field, and makes suggestions for future studies. Topics include theoretical frameworks 491 
(interdependence, appropriateness, evolutionary), developments in structural, psychological and dynamic influences, 492 
and prospects for future social dilemmas. They suggest that moving forward scholars could explore further the role of 493 
emotions, construal processes, facial information, intergroup issues, reputation, and gossip. 494 
Structural influences. De Cremer et al. (2012) discuss the integration between procedural justice, sanctioning 495 
systems, and public good dilemmas. Because there is little or no incentive for voluntary provisions in public goods 496 
dilemmas, it is in everyone’s benefit to take advantage of them without contributing to their production. They found 497 
that the procedural justice of the sanction had greater influence when the group failed early in the game and the group 498 
members exhibited high group identification. If the group members did not identify with the group, the procedural 499 
justice of the sanction only influenced contributions if the group had succeeded earlier in the game. Therefore, 500 
procedural justice matters in the sanctioning system’s effectiveness.  501 
Kugler and Bornstein (2013) investigate the role of conflict structure in social dilemmas. Bilateral conflicts between 502 
groups and an individual, such as a confrontation between an employer and group of workers, involve asymmetric and 503 
complex interactions. In computer-controlled experiments, individuals and non-cooperative groups interacted in social 504 
dilemmas games. This asymmetric competition was compared to symmetric control conditions in which both 505 
competitors were either individuals or groups. Results showed that individuals generally did better than non-cooperative 506 
groups, regardless of conflict type. In symmetric conditions, individuals showed more cooperation with other individuals 507 
as compared to cooperation between groups. In asymmetric conditions, individuals took advantage of the group’s 508 
difficulties and dominated.  509 
Psychological influences. Balliet and Ferris (2013) conducted research to better understand the relationship 510 
between ostracism and prosocial behavior. They hypothesized that whether individuals reduce prosocial behavior 511 
following ostracism depends on how they managed the temptation to treat others poorly in the short-term versus the 512 
long-term benefits of not treating others poorly. The studies showed that individuals who are less future-oriented 513 
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engaged in less prosocial behavior with others who have ostracized them than those who are more future-oriented. 514 
Yamagishi et al. (2013) also investigated pro-social behavior in a study in which participants completed five games (two 515 
prisoner’s dilemmas, a trust game, a dictator game, and a faith game) with several month intervals in between games. 516 
The first major finding of this study was that participants showed across-game behavioral consistency. There was a 517 
strong correlation between the trusting choice in the faith games and acting in a pro-social manner in the other games. 518 
It was also found that there were significant cross-game correlations between expectations of the partner’s behavior and 519 
a player’s own behavior. This showed that a player’s generalized expectations of human pro-sociality affected their own 520 
pro-social behavior.  521 
Social value orientation has also been found to be related to cooperative behaviors in social dilemmas. Fiedler et al. 522 
(2013) considered the underlying processes of this relationship. Decision time, number of fixations, the proportion of 523 
inspected information, the degree of attention toward the others’ payoffs and the number of transitions from and toward 524 
others’ payoffs increased with social value orientation deviation from a pure selfish orientation. Information search 525 
seems to underlie the relationship between social value orientation and cooperation.  526 
Intergenerational dilemmas. Some of the most important issues in organizations and society today have long 527 
time horizons and thus conflict can involve more than one generation of people. Intergenerational decisions regarding 528 
the allocation and consumption of resources may create a conflict of interest between the present and future generations 529 
as the present generation may be required to forego the consumption of desirable resources to maintain sustainable 530 
levels for the future. Economists have examined how to balance the interests of present and future generations such 531 
that efficiency is optimized (e.g., Kotlikoff, 1995; Portney & Weyant, 1999). In contrast to this normative approach, a 532 
burgeoning body of scholarship in teams of management scholars and social psychologists focus on identifying the 533 
psychological factors that affect intergenerational decisions (see Wade-Benzoni & Tost, 2009, for a review). Most of 534 
this work centers on “intergenerational dilemmas,” defined as decisions in which the interests of present decision makers 535 
conflict with the interests of future others.  536 
An imperative in the study of intergenerational dilemmas has been to identify factors that influence the extent to 537 
which members of the present generation (void of economic or material incentive) are willing to sacrifice their own self-538 
interest for the benefit of future others. Central variables that affect decisions about intergenerational conflict include 539 
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temporal and interpersonal distance between decisions and outcomes (Wade-Benzoni, 2003; 2008), uncertainty about 540 
the future (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2008; see also McCarter et al., 2010), lack of direct reciprocity between generations 541 
(Bang et al., 2017; Wade-Benzoni, 2002), egocentrism (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2008), asymmetric power (Tost et al., 2015), 542 
resource valence (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2010), and legacy motivations (Fox et al., 2010; Wade-Benzoni, 2006; Wade-543 
Benzoni et al., 2012).  544 
3.4. Trends using the social exchange model 545 
Subsequent empirical work on resource dependence models, building on social exchange theory, sought to 546 
understand bridging mechanisms (Thompson, 1967) which allow organizations to manage their constraints with other 547 
organizations. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. 114) maintain that organizations use bridging mechanisms to “accomplish 548 
a restructuring of the organization’s interdependencies, rather than for reasons of profitability or efficiency.”  The 549 
earliest empirical work citing resource dependency identifying bridging mechanisms was carried out by Pfeffer and his 550 
colleagues (Pfeffer, 1972a, 1972b, 1973; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980).  551 
Principle interest centered on actions firms take to minimize dependencies which lessen external constraints namely: 552 
mergers and acquisitions (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005), joint venture/alliances (e.g. Mitchell & Singh, 1992), alliance 553 
portfolios (Gomes-Casseres, 1994), political action (Mullery et al., 1995), executive succession (Dalton & Kesner, 1983), 554 
trade associations (Granovetter, 1994) and boards of directors (Davis & Mizruchi, 1999). Specifically, Scott and Davis 555 
(2003) noted that much empirical research surrounding resource dependence theory investigates the relationship 556 
between the firm and its board of directors. Firms may appoint board members to help facilitate access to resources 557 
(e.g. Davis & Mizruchi, 1999). For example, in countries where nationalization of firms is a risk, many companies tend 558 
to seek board representatives from government to increase their likelihood of favorable policies towards the firm (e.g. 559 
Liang et al., 2015). Three recent themes we note emerging over the past five years address the relationship between 560 
power and dependence, relational outcomes given power imbalances, and learning from terminating bridging 561 
mechanisms such as alliances. We review each of these recent themes below.  562 
Power versus dependence. A firm seeking to use size as leverage may wish to pursue mergers and acquisitions to 563 
gain power. Empire building, through increased of merger and acquisition activity, may exist because a firm wants to 564 
increase its size as leverage over key stakeholders, such as suppliers or politicians (Darnall et al., 2010; Hope & Thomas, 565 
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2008). Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) found that acquisition activity followed a pattern of power and dependence. Rather 566 
than theorizing dependence as solely the inverse of power, Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) posited that industries are 567 
both composed of power relations as well as conditions of mutual dependence. Mutual dependence reflects the shared 568 
level of constraints between two parties. Their study considered both types of relational constraints finding separate 569 
effects of power and mutual dependence in merger and acquisition activity. This conceptualization that power and 570 
dependence as distinct constructs led to understanding a variety of organizational outcomes including alliances (Lee et 571 
al., 2015) and divestitures (Xia & Li, 2013). 572 
Trust development under power asymmetry. Conflict may exacerbate from failed expectations from previous 573 
trust violations (Lumineau et al., 2015). Trust exists between firms as a positive expectation that the counterpart will act 574 
in good faith (Rousseau et al., 1998; Zaheer et al., 1998). As firms continue to work through their conflict, they are likely 575 
to establish a reputation of trustworthiness within their industry (Park & Ungson, 2001). Consequently, a firm’s 576 
enhanced reputation may make it easier for the firm to form new alliances. However, trust development and beliefs are 577 
not always symmetric across both parties in power imbalanced relationships where firms make asymmetric investments. 578 
One partner may believe they are in a trusting relationship while the other may not, particularly in single shot games 579 
(e.g. Graebner, 2009). Firms may also compensate for asymmetries between organizational groups by using structural 580 
mechanisms such as contracts. Lumineau and Malhotra (2011) found that contracts influence the type of conflict 581 
resolution approaches adopted by disputing firms particularly where power is asymmetric. Further, McEvily et al. (2017) 582 
found that power imbalances impact the antecedents to trust for each party in different ways, so that less powerful 583 
parties would look towards the more powerful party to determine their own perceptions about the more powerful party 584 
in relationship, largely ignoring their own circumstance.  585 
Alliance termination. Firms may seek alternate forms of relationships among organizational groups such as 586 
strategic alliances that can more fluidly adapt to the external environment than acquisitions. The pattern of failures for 587 
acquisitions is well-understood by the market, as purchasing firm’s stock prices tend to lower on acquisition 588 
announcements (Morck et al., 1990). However, alliance termination rates also remain similarly high at 50-70%, with 589 
these estimates potentially under-reporting terminations as firms are not required to disclose non-equity alliance 590 
activities. Pfeffer and Nowak (1976) found a relationship between changes in the external environment and alliance 591 
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termination. Given the preponderance of alliance termination rates, Faems et al. (2008) extended prior work on alliance 592 
terminations to consider how alliance partners may use a failing relationship to successfully execute another alliance in 593 
tandem. Their case study of subsequent ink-jet printer R&D alliances between the same partners suggests that 594 
restructuring a prior alliance may be an alternate recourse for a firms’ adjusting to their external environment. Moreover, 595 
Mellewigt et al., (2017) reveal that – after an alliance has been terminated – the recurrence of the same partnership as 596 
another alliance or acquisition is impacted by the characteristics of the prior alliance. The characteristics which influence 597 
the likelihood of a subsequent alliance are partner-specific: trust, routines, and the focal firm’s understanding of the 598 
target firm’s assets. Thus, knowledge gained about a former partner in a prior transaction may be beneficial in 599 
subsequent relationships with the same partner.  600 
3.5. Trends using the transaction cost economics model 601 
Streams of work in the management literature have largely focused on make-buy decisions, but also the role of 602 
hierarchy such as M-form and U-form organizations, employment relationships assessing short-term temporary work 603 
versus long-term full-time employment as well as complex contracts where relational and formal contracts play 604 
complementary governance support (Scott & Davis, 2003; see Macher & Richman, 2008 for a review of empirical work). 605 
Organizational scholars were particularly interested in hybrid forms of governance (Williamson 1983, 1991) such that 606 
an entire continuum of governance choices between make versus buy ranging from licensing to equity arrangements 607 
such as joint ventures (Oxley, 1999; Park & Russo, 1996) could be approached as outcomes of transaction cost 608 
considerations. Within the management literature the empirical work investigating transaction cost economics has 609 
mainly focused on comparing and integrating other organizational theories by relaxing initial assumptions and 610 
integrating relationship, firm, and transaction level considerations (Hoetker, 2005; Ghosh & John, 1999, 2005; Argyres, 611 
1996). Building on the resource based view of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991), prior work suggests that a 612 
firm’s distinctive competencies increases the efficiency of the governance choice (Silverman, 1999), thus implying similar 613 
transactions for different firms may employ alternate governance structures (Nickerson et al., 2001). More broadly, 614 
organizational scholars have also drawn from organizational theories invoking the external environment (Osborn & 615 
Baughn, 1990) and institutional theory (Hughes et al., 1997, Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Zhao et al., 2004).  616 
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Opportunism and trust. The role of opportunism played a role in transaction cost economics since its 617 
conceptualization. Many transaction hazards are exacerbated by an absence of trust due to the threat of opportunism. 618 
Specifically, Williamson (1993) argues in favor of calculative trust where actors are better served by guarding themselves 619 
against opportunism. This contrasts with other scholars’ view of trust as a willingness to be vulnerable to the other party 620 
(Zaheer et al., 1998), by entering an exchange with positive expectations (McCarter & Northcraft, 2007). Contracts 621 
moderate the trust-conflict relationship (e.g. Poppo & Zenger, 2002) by clarifying partners’ expectations and detail 622 
conflict resolution mechanisms. Where trust may be relatively weak initially, contracts may facilitate partners’ beliefs 623 
about trust in the other by enhancing transparency. Likewise, stronger forms of trust may lessen the need for costlier 624 
forms of alliance relationships such as equity based arrangements that create mutual hostages which safeguard against 625 
conflict (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). Recently, Lumineau and colleagues (Guo et al., 2017; Lumineau, 2017) argue that 626 
trust and distrust can co-exist simultaneously.  627 
Unpacking uncertainty. The recent work of Weber and her co-authors develop transaction cost theorizing by 628 
focusing on the psychological elements of the exchange relationship surrounding uncertainty. Weber and Mayer (2014) 629 
introduced cognitive frames by theorizing about conflict due to uncertainty. They define uncertainty as any 630 
“unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange” (Noordewier et al., 1990, p. 82). Traditionally, 631 
scholars have focused on how uncertainty in the external environment increases transaction costs due to opportunism 632 
(Williamson, 1975) and information overload (Simon, 1957). Weber and Mayer (2014) expanded the theory that 633 
transaction costs and conflict arise from differing interpretations of the environment due to each party’s unique 634 
cognitive frames. In other words, they posit that if the parties involved have conflicting cognitive frames their 635 
interpretation of the unanticipated event will differ leading to divergent opinions of how to respond to the event leading 636 
to conflict. Moreover, they argue that efficient governing mechanisms are those that facilitate congruent cognitive 637 
frames. Foss and Weber (2016) draw from the bounded rationality literature addressed a common critique of transaction 638 
cost economics: it fails to explain when hierarchies collapse or differ in efficiency.  639 
Negotiation roles. The role of each party in a relationship may also influence the bargaining process as well as the 640 
design of efficient governance structures. As mentioned above, as firms continue to work with each other their 641 
subsequent boundary spanning representatives will establish familiar routines, trust each other and consequently 642 
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decrease transaction costs (e.g. Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). However, recently scholars indicate that the parties involved 643 
in the contracting relationship may influence the efficiency of the outcome (e.g. Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Bercovitz & 644 
Tyler, 2014). For example, Bercovitz and Tyler (2014) examined the contracting relationship between scientists and for-645 
profit institutions and found that firm representatives were more likely to increase the specificity of the contract over 646 
time, whereas the scientists were more likely to decrease it. Others have looked at the influence of power gained by 647 
buyer versus supplier firm roles (e.g. McEvily et al., 2017; Nyaga et al., 2013) suggesting there may also be differences 648 
in sources of governance derived from the positions the parties occupy across the value chain.  649 
4. Future Directions for Conflict Research in Management 650 
Harnessing conflict’s advantages and navigating its burdens continues to be the focal interest of management 651 
scholars. In the current section, we summarize what we believe to be the important future research directions for each 652 
area of management research utilizing the six reviewed models of conflict. 653 
4.1. The future of diversity-conflict models 654 
There is no dearth of research on diversity-conflict models reporting the statistically significance of the relationships 655 
among diversity, conflict types, and team performance (see De Dreu & Weingart, 2003, for a meta-analysis). However, 656 
one avenue with little traffic is to determine the model’s practical significance. Most scholars on the diversity-conflict 657 
model ask Is there an effect between a diversity and team performance as mediated by conflict? The next question is to ask How much 658 
of an effect is there? In knowing the size of the science behind the diversity-conflict model will give us the model’s 659 
“organizational significance” (Shaver, 2008). Surprisingly, our review of the diversity-conflict finds little examination of 660 
magnitude - at least when it comes to quantifiable outcomes. The neglect of putting size to the science is a lack of 661 
confidence in the model’s practical power (McCloskey & Ziliak, 1996). It is one thing for the diversity-conflict theorist 662 
to say to an executive “you can capitalize on the differences in teams through behavioral leadership training that reduces 663 
team conflict,” and it is another more meaningful thing to say, “Typically managers who are trained in how to be 664 
consistent in how they respectfully instruct and encourage their teams will see 20% fewer sick days and an 15% increase 665 
in sales from employees.”  While there are multiple ways to assess a theory’s practical size, McCloskey and Ziliak’s 666 
(1996) assessment approach may be a good starting point.  667 
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Another field ripe for picking involves finding strategies that encourage wanted conflict while not simultaneously 668 
encouraging unwanted conflict. For instance, encouraging a devil’s advocacy strategy in a team increases task conflict 669 
but it can also simultaneously increase relational conflict (Cosier & Rose, 1977). Carton and Tewfik’s (2016) recent 670 
review of conflict strategies proposes that strategies used in isolation may do more harm than good. Rather, 671 
combinations of strategies are submitted by Carton and Tewfik (2016) to be more effective in successfully navigating 672 
diversity-stemmed conflict. Future scholarship may produce findings of high theoretical and practical significance by 673 
testing the arguments made in the Carton and Tewfink (2016) paper. A second layer of the conflict-strategy puzzle 674 
germane to the Carton and Tewfink (2016) taxonomy and theory is knowing who is best to implement the solutions. A 675 
promising theory to help solve this puzzle is decision process theory. Decision process theory would maintain that who 676 
implements a solution is just as important as which solutions are employed (e.g. Vroom & Yetton, 1973). For instance, 677 
teams high in status conflict may not react well to a fellow teammate using intervention and prefer an outsider to institute 678 
chance solutions.  679 
4.2. The future of behavioral negotiation model 680 
Two areas have seen increasing development pertaining to the behavioral negotiation model. The first is sacred 681 
issues or ideologically or value-based issues play out differently than negotiations dealing with more traditional material 682 
interests (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Tenbrunsel et al., 2009; Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002b). When an issue involves a 683 
closely held value, people are less likely to be willing to make tradeoffs on that issue in exchange for something else. 684 
Naturally, this can interfere with the essential “logrolling” aspect of integrative negotiations. Research has revealed that 685 
opposing sides in ideological conflicts tend to exaggerate their opponents’ extremism (Keltner & Robinson, 1993; 686 
Robinson et al., 1995; Robinson & Kray, 2001). Sacred issues in negotiations tend to increase the likelihood of impasse, 687 
reduce the profitability of outcomes, and produce more negative perceptions of opponents - particularly when 688 
negotiators have a strong best alternative to a negotiated agreement (Tenbrunsel et al., 2009). More recently, Bendersky 689 
(2014) proposed a way to solve ideological conflict: affirming an opponent’s status may help reduce defensiveness and 690 
resistance to compromising in ideological conflicts. In a study by Tuller et al. (2015), participants were asked to write 691 
about a controversial issue from the perspective of a partner with an opposing view. The approach was effective at 692 
changing views but only when participants met with the opponent in person and observed the perspective-taking effort.  693 
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The study of individual differences and personality initially fell out of favor among negotiation scholars due to early 694 
research by Rubin and Brown (1975) concluding that it had little impact on negotiation behavior and outcomes. For 695 
many years, negotiation scholars have been enamored with studying the power of the situation to influence negotiations 696 
(Brett & Thompson, 2016). However, a relatively recent meta-analysis concluded that a variety of individual differences 697 
affect the strategies negotiators use, individual and joint gains, and psychological outcomes (Sharma et al., 2013). The 698 
effect of personality was further investigated by Dimotakis et al. (2012) who found that negotiators high in agreeableness 699 
were best suited for integrative negotiations while negotiators low in agreeableness were best suited for distributive 700 
negotiations. Negotiators whose dispositions were a good fit for their context had higher levels of cardiac arousal than 701 
those who were not a good fit, which related to positive affect, persistence, and increased economic outcomes.  702 
4.3. The future of social dilemma models 703 
A significant body of research on cooperation has opened questions of how such knowledge can be applied to 704 
social dilemmas in real-world conflicts. An important challenge regarding practical implications is that much of the 705 
current debate on the problem of cooperation in social dilemmas assumes a static, one-time relationship. Unlike 706 
experimental settings, social interactions in real life involve repeated interactions in which decision makers actively 707 
respond to changes in its dynamic and adopt different strategies (Van Lange et al., 2013). For example, business ventures 708 
often involve repeated partnership and dealings. Sometimes the end of the business relationship is expected, such as 709 
when contract duration is specified, but can be ambiguous in other relationships. An awareness of possible future 710 
encounters and long-term relationships can have significant impact on individual choices in social dilemmas. If repeated 711 
encounters are expected, acting selfishly and pushing the other too hard can invite retaliation in the future (Axelrod, 712 
1984). Conversely, if the interaction is likely to end soon, individuals may discount the future payoffs and the interest 713 
of others and decide not to cooperate in the present.  714 
The prospective of future interactions also involves possible encounters with others in the same network. 715 
Reputation matters in the interconnected society and discourages individuals from engaging in socially undesirable 716 
behavior. Knowing that today’s selfish or cooperative action may trigger a negative or positive feedback loop in future 717 
conflicts can encourage individuals to contemplate their long-term reputations (McCarter et al., 2011b). A non-718 
cooperative reputation can eventually lead to ostracism (Kerr et al., 2009). On a more psychological level, people are in 719 
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fact aware of this effect of transparency and more likely to cooperate with subtle signals of being watched by others 720 
(Bateson et al., 2006). Understanding such a reputational mechanism will also be informative in social dilemmas in larger 721 
settings, in which uncertainty and anonymity are the major obstacles to cooperation. For example, Weber and 722 
Murnighan (2008) find that a consistent contributor in social dilemmas creates cooperative perceptions of social norms, 723 
which facilitates fellow members’ cooperation. In this case, while the emergence of contributors may underlie the role 724 
of individual difference factors, efforts to increase structural transparency and reputational effects are crucial to support 725 
and facilitate their positive influences on other members. Therefore, the lessons derived from understanding one’s 726 
perspective on relationships through time or across partners will be worthy of future investigation, providing 727 
prescriptive advice regarding paths to cooperation. 728 
4.4. The future of social exchange models 729 
Scholars may focus on how the consequences of conflict may be impacted by power asymmetry. Conflict itself is 730 
not necessarily positive or negative for any organizational relationship, despite its pervasiveness. Prior emphasis on 731 
symmetry in mutual understanding across partners (e.g. Lewis & Wiegert, 1985) for mitigating conflict may not account 732 
for the diverse perceptions each party brings to their relationship (e.g. Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998). As Pondy (1967) 733 
explained, that the function of conflict can be either beneficial or detrimental for the relationship and parties involved. 734 
We note that the firm level potential benefits gained through conflict are likely similar in imbalanced and balanced power 735 
relationships (Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Park & Ungson, 2001). The difference lies in the likelihood for resolution 736 
between the two parties, affecting outcomes at the level of the dyad. Power advantaged firms might be privileged in 737 
guiding conflict resolution and, propose for future research, that firms in asymmetric relationships may be more likely 738 
to find a resolution than those in symmetric power relationships. Power asymmetry may play more of a positive role in 739 
mitigating conflict than prior work has assumed.  740 
4.5. The future of transaction cost economics models 741 
As management scholars look to the future there is a trend towards taking a micro-foundational approach to the 742 
transaction cost literature. Such recent theorizing may lend well to empirical testing in laboratory environments. Future 743 
conflict researchers might heed Lumineau et al.’s (2015) recommendation that transaction cost perspectives can explore 744 
different types of conflict among organizational groups, such as integrity-based and competence-based failures. 745 
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However, with many of these conflict types, the offending firm may have a divergent perception of what validates their 746 
past behavior, misinterpreting the potential of an integrity-violation as an act of strategic necessity (e.g. Sutcliffe & 747 
Zaheer, 1998). For example, in pursuit of greater efficiency, the offending firm may utilize more resources than the 748 
other party perceives as appropriate and unintentionally cause conflict within the relationship. To that end, we add that 749 
the long-term impact on value creation versus the share of value captured by the partners (e.g. Elfenbein & Zenger, 750 
2017), may be a promising avenue to pursue to understand each party’s costs and motivations in maintaining governance 751 
structures despite the presence of conflict. 752 
5. An Integration of Intragroup Conflict Models 753 
There are patterns and differences across the five models reviewed. Indeed, each model complements the others in 754 
a host of ways, and this complementarity is summarized in Table 2.  755 
5.1. Insights about intragroup conflict 756 
A common thread across the five models is that conflict within a group can create considerable barriers to 757 
organizational effectiveness. Diversity-conflict models predict that teams with high relational, process, and status 758 
conflict will not perform well. Social dilemma models predict that – without restructuring the payoffs, instigating 759 
cooperative contextual cues, and removing competitive individuals – costly conflict will increase. Behavioral negotiation 760 
models maintain that when negotiators take primarily a distributive approach to dividing resources that conflict will be 761 
high and the likelihood of achieving an agreement is low. When it comes to conflict among alliances networks (Gomes-762 
Casseres, 1994), social exchange models suggest that control over resources motivates organizations to reduce 763 
dependence on each other. Intragroup conflict might arise out of this struggle for control. The transaction cost 764 
economics model proposes that conflict will increase the use of safeguards, thereby increasing use of costlier forms of 765 
organizing in alliance relations.  766 
A key difference rests in what these models say about positive outcomes from conflict. Diversity-conflict and 767 
behavioral negotiation models both predict that the work team or negotiating parties will be better off when conflict 768 
exists under certain conditions; e.g. moderate levels of task conflict and competing preferences where there are different 769 
values. Social dilemma and transaction cost models see intragroup conflict as primarily a negative event that can only 770 
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be mitigated through structural or motivation solutions.7 Social exchange models suggest that firms can establish more 771 
independence by using conflict to lessen their dependence on resources from other firms.  772 
Overall, three models (i.e. diversity-conflict, behavioral negotiation, and social exchange models) view intragroup 773 
conflict as a contingency process where two of the models (i.e. social dilemma and transaction cost models) view 774 
intragroup conflict as resulting in a negative outcome. Of the five models, only the diversity-conflict model parses 775 
conflict into a multidimensional construct (i.e. task conflict, relational conflict, process conflict, and status conflict) 776 
where the remaining models see conflict as one-dimensional – leading to either a positive or negative outcome.8        777 
5.2. How conflict is conceptualized 778 
The volume of conflict research in management studies brings with it different views about intragroup conflict. 779 
Consequently, the models reviewed here define intragroup conflict differently. Transaction cost economics define 780 
intragroup conflict as “a destructive process, creating negative reactions” (White et al., 2007). Social dilemma models 781 
view conflict as a tension between individual and group interests, where an individual cannot do something to benefit 782 
themselves without harming the group (Kollock, 1998). Taken together, transaction cost economics and social dilemma 783 
models view intragroup conflict as always resulting in a negative outcome that should be either navigated or discouraged.  784 
On the other hand, diversity-conflict, behavioral negotiation, and social exchange models view intragroup conflict 785 
as something that can be leveraged. The diversity-conflict model sees conflict as a multi-dimensional construct, with 786 
such dimensions as task conflict being something to encourage and relational conflict being something to avoid (Jehn 787 
et al., 1999). Behavioral negotiation models also view conflict as being a good thing or a bad thing depending on what 788 
issues the negotiators value, how much those issues are valued, and what information is shared among negotiating 789 
parties. The information exchange process helps both sides better understand each other’s interests and thus make 790 
possible tradeoffs among integrative issues, thereby meeting all parties’ interests (Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2010). 791 
Social exchange models suggest that, as firms continue to work together and resolve conflicts, they will begin to establish 792 
strong relational norms, trust, and commitment (Lumineau et al., 2015; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). Consequently, 793 
they will rely less on formal and costly governance mechanisms (e.g. contracts) to settle conflict as time passes (Gulati 794 
& Nickerson, 2008). The differences in the models’ definitions of conflict leave us with our broad definition of 795 
intragroup conflict that we began with in the current review.  796 
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5.3. Analytical unit of analysis and methodology 797 
There are differences among the five models when it comes to the unit of analysis and methodology. Diversity-798 
conflict and behavioral negotiation models are studied primarily at the individual, human subject level as part of a work 799 
team or community. Transaction cost economics and social exchange models examine intragroup conflict primarily at 800 
the interorganizational level as part of an alliance venture (portfolio, consortia, or network or partners) with the caveat 801 
that transaction cost examines transactions and firms may be involved in multiple transactions simultaneously. Social 802 
dilemma models – while originally used at the individual human-subject level – are now regularly used to understand 803 
intragroup conflict among organizations.  804 
Behavioral negotiation and social dilemma models are almost exclusively studied in the behavioral laboratory, where 805 
there is tight control over testing the model relationships. It is only recently that management scholars have used field 806 
studies (i.e. natural experiments) to examine the general application of social dilemma models (e.g. Van den Assem et 807 
al., 2012). Diversity-conflict models have been tested in the behavioral laboratory as well, but have also examined the 808 
direct application of the models through longitudinal field studies where team structure, conflict types, and performance 809 
are measured at different points in time (e.g. Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Jehn et al., 1997; Jehn et al., 1999).  810 
Social exchange and transaction cost models both have been approached using mixed-methods. More recently 811 
scholars have turned their attention towards testing social exchange theory in the behavioral laboratory (e.g. Galinsky, 812 
Rucker & Magee, 2015) but less so at an interorganizational level as much interorganizational research has been tested 813 
through survey and archival data. Thus, scholars have examined the direct application of social exchange models while 814 
also recently wanting higher control when testing the models’ relationships. In contrast, more recent laboratory-based 815 
studies of transaction cost economics complement years of field studies that examine the applicability of the models 816 
(e.g. Harmon, Kim & Mayer, 2015; for reviews see McDowell & Voelker, 2008; Macher & Richmann, 2008).  817 
6. Concluding Remark 818 
The study of intragroup conflict in management is old, at least old in relation to the tenure of the management field. 819 
The fact that management lies at the confluence of multiple fields in the social sciences, has resulted in a voluminous 820 
body of conflict research, making it difficult for a single article to present the curious student a comprehensive review. 821 
The current research summarizes five models used to study intragroup conflict in management. Each model has been 822 
33 
 
the muse for scholars to understand how existing conflict can be leveraged (even increased) to an individual’s advantage; 823 
how conflict can be reduced to an individual’s advantage; and the contingencies of when conflict is a blessing and a 824 
curse for a person or organization. Figure 2 is a Venn diagram conceptualizing the conflict research domain in 825 
management and provides a sample of empirical and theory papers across the five models.  826 
While each model has been well-used and improved upon, many unanswered, important questions about conflict 827 
in and among organizations remains. Management scholars who want to make a significant impact in the study of 828 
conflict may consider problematizing the models or challenging core assumptions of a model while bringing alternative 829 
logics and models from the literature’s periphery into consideration (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011). In doing so, 830 
management will increase its collective wisdom about conflict. In other words, in knowing what it does not know or 831 
what it assumes it knows about conflict, management scholars will be better equipped to make order out of the chaos 832 
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1 While the management field has many top-tier scholarly outlets for research, our review primarily covers articles 
published in top-tier North American management journals. Our reasoning patterns after Pratt’s (2008) in his review of best 
practices in qualitative management research: publishing in the Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Organization Science, and Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes would advance an 
academic toward tenure and promotion in any business school in the world. Journals like Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal 
of Personality & Social Psychology, Management Science, Journal of Operations Management, and Strategic Management Journal, while also 
prestigious in management, are kept to a minimum in the review because they also represent flagship journals in fields of 
psychology, social psychology, management science, operations research, and strategy.  
 
2 Occasionally, some scholars draw a line between intergroup and intragroup conflict, with intragroup conflict only 
occurring within organizations and intergroup conflict only occurring among organizations (e.g. Smith et al., 1995). Indeed, 
across the expanse of management studies, some literatures conceptualize a group in this way, focusing on a collective of 
people within an organization; e.g. the group process (e.g. Van de Ven & Delbecq, 1971) and strategic group decision 
making literatures (e.g. Cool & Schendel, 1987). However, the current paper follows the broader conceptualization of 
groups suggested by the writings of Sullivan (2002) and Staw (1991): a group is any collective of agents – be they humans, 
departments, firms, communities, or generations – who are interdependently connected.  
 
3 Indeed, each of the models we review have their own reviews. The curious student may consider the following sample 
reviews that primarily describe each literatures’ findings: the diversity-conflict model (e.g. Mannix & Neale, 2005), social 
dilemma models (e.g. Van Lange et al., 2013), the behavioral-negotiation model (e.g. Thompson et al., 2010), the social 
exchange model (e.g. Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), and the transaction cost economics model (e.g. Silverman, 2002). 
 
4 Early management papers researching conflict likened conflict to war through various terms and descriptors; e.g. battles, 
attack, hurt, and harm (e.g. Thompson, 1961). These terms, for the most part, declined in use during the 1970s, were near 
extinct by the 1990s, and now appear but occasionally in management research in such developing areas as territoriality in 
organizations (e.g. Brown et al., 2005) and hypercompetition (e.g. D’aveni & Gunther, 2010). Therefore, we do not address 
war research in the current review of the management literature.  
 
5 Recent scholarship merged the ideas of give-some and take-some dilemmas into a hybrid social dilemma termed the 
give-or-take-some dilemma (McCarter et al., 2011a; Budescu & McCarter, 2012). Its considerable newness and dearth of 
research, while providing much room for exploration, makes the give-or-take-some dilemma not a focus of the current review. 
For further discussion about the give-or-take-some dilemma, the reader may benefit from Van Lange et al.’s (2013) review of 
the psychology of social dilemmas. 
 
6 The reader may find of interest work utilizing the social exchange model to understand intragroup in the context of 
organizational justice, workplace politics, incivility, and abusive supervision (e.g. Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Zellars, 
Tepper, & Duffy, 2002).  
 
7 The reader may find of interest Gary Bornstein’s work on increasing cooperation within groups by increasing conflict 
between them (e.g. Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994; Bornstein et al., 1990). These experiments are not reviewed in the 
current paper because they examine conflict between groups and not within them. 
 
8 Social dilemma models distinguish between opportunistic and defensive conflict or defection (e.g. McCarter et al., 
2010; McCarter et al., 2011b; Rockmann & Northcraft, 2008). However, the multidimensionality of conflict here is between 
why a person chooses a course of action that harms the collective and not a course that can benefit the collective through 
conflict. 
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Table 1: Research on Intragroup Conflict in Management
 Topic Description 
1) The definition of conflict is … a dynamic process whereby at least one agent feels, perceives, or behaves in opposition toward 
another agent.  
   
2) Main models of intragroup conflict include … • diversity-conflict model 
• behavioral negotiation model 
• social dilemma models 
• social exchange model, and 
• transaction cost model 
 
3) Foundational publications for each model include … • general conflict research: Thompson (1960); Cyert & March (1963); Litterer (1966);  
and Pondy (1967) 
• diversity-conflict model: Jehn (1995, 1997); and Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale (1999) 
• behavioral negotiation model: Walton & McKersie (1965); Pruitt & Rubin (1986); and Neale  
& Northcraft (1991) 
• social dilemma model: Dawes (1980); Messick & Brewer (1983); Kollock (1998); and Weber,  
Kopelman, & Messick (2004) 
• social exchange model: Emerson (1962); Blau (1964); and Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) 
• transaction cost economics model: Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975)    
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Social Exchange  
Models 
Transaction Cost  
Models 
Key ideas include … Promote certain kinds 
of conflict (e.g. task 
conflict) while 
discouraging others; 
e.g. relational and 
status conflict through 
group characteristics. 
Decrease conflict through 
structural and motivational 
solutions that encourage 
strategies that benefit the 
collective as well as the 
individual.  
Leverage conflict through 
integrative negotiation 
where the parties value the 
issues differently, creating 
more value to divide 
through distributive 
negotiation.  
Desire for independence 
motivates conflict where 
parties are interdependent 
for their access to shared 
resources. 
Efficient contract design 
mitigates conflict and 
facilitates order. Risk of 
opportunism, motivates 
actors to seek appropriate 
safeguards against conflict.  
Conflict primarily viewed 
as resulting in a … 
Mix of positive and 
negative outcomes 
Negative outcome Mix of positive and negative 
outcomes 
Mix of positive and negative 
outcomes 
Negative outcome 
Analytic units are … Individual and group 
level 
Individual and group level Individual and dyad Dyad and Network Transaction 
Methodologies include … Individual and team-
level field surveys, and 
laboratory experiments 
Individual and team-level 
laboratory experiments 
Individual and dyad-level 
laboratory experiments 
Case studies and large 
sample field studies 
Large sample field studies 
and laboratory experiments 
Disciplinary foundation 
based in … 
Organizational 
behavior 
Social psychology Organizational behavior / 
Social psychology 
Social psychology / 
Sociology / Organizational 
theory 
Economics 
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Figure 1: Conflict-Related Papers in Top North-American Management Journals, 1990-2015 
 
 
Note: The figure was generated based on five journals Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, 
Organizational Science, and Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes. The search terms – e.g. conflict, cooperation, social dilemma, negotiation, and 
alliance – commonly associated with models of conflict in management. Web of Science searches for articles within the given journals with these terms 







Figure 2: A Venn diagram of intragroup conflict research in management with a focus on five models and a 1 




Note: BN, DC, SD, SE, and TCE are acronyms for the Behavioral Negotiation model, the Diversity Conflict model, 6 





Jehn et al. (1999) DC
Neale & Northcraft (1991) BN
Dawes (1980) SD
Weber et al. (2004) SD
Williamson (1975) TCE
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) SE 
Greer et al. (2011) DC
Amanatullah & Tinsley (2013) BN
Weber & Mayer (2014) TCE
Lumineau et al. (2015) TCE
McCarter et al. (2011b) SD
Carton & Tewfik (2016) DC
Kray & Thompson (2005) BN
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